[SYS] Bound remaining MQTT/HTTP/BLE/RF inputs into fixed buffers (#2324)
Follow-up to #2321. That PR fixed five strcpy sites in XtoSYS/createOrUpdateDevice but left adjacent attack surfaces using the same pattern (strncpy with the destination's own size, leaving the buffer non-NUL-terminated when the source is at the limit; or strcpy of WiFiManager/HTTP form values that bypass the client-side maxlength). The over-long string then flows into saveConfig() and back into a strcpy on next boot, corrupting heap/.bss on every reload. main/main.cpp - XtoSYS: length-check before copying mqtt_topic, discovery_prefix, gateway_name, gw_pass (ota_pass), and ble_aes. Reject over-length with THEENGS_LOG_WARNING, preserving existing values. main/main.cpp - loadConfigFromFlash: new loadStrField() helper applies the same guard to every SPIFFS-loaded string (mqtt_server/port/user/pass per slot, mqtt_topic, discovery_prefix, gateway_name, ota_pass, ble_aes). Defense in depth in case a pre-fix build left an over-length value in /config.json. main/main.cpp - WiFiManager save: bound mqtt_topic against the 150-byte portal buffer overflowing the 66-byte destination (HTML maxlength is client-side only; a raw POST bypasses it). main/webUI.cpp - handleCG /gw save: bound gateway-password form input before the strncpy that previously left ota_pass non-NUL-terminated. main/blufi.cpp - ESP_BLUFI_EVENT_RECV_STA_SSID/PASSWD: clamp the wire-supplied ssid_len/passwd_len before the memcpy and the trailing NUL so a crafted BluFi provisioning frame cannot overrun gl_sta_ssid[32]/gl_sta_passwd[64]. main/gatewayBT.cpp - BLEDecryptor (Victron, encr==3): remove `nonce[16] = {0}`, a one-byte stack-OOB write reachable from any BLE adv. The line was dead (the memset two lines later zeroes the whole array); deleting it eliminates the OOB write. main/gatewaySRFB.cpp - SRFBtoX: bound the _uartbuf writer so a 433 MHz frame with no STOP can no longer let _uartpos grow past sizeof(_uartbuf). main/gatewaySRFB.cpp - _rfbSend: the hex output buffer was sized RF_MESSAGE_SIZE (9) but _rawToHex writes 2*N+2 bytes per call. Resize to fit. Tested on a Theengs Bridge: built theengs-bridge-v11 env, OTA-flashed, and verified that publishing {"discovery_prefix":"Z"*200} to MQTTtoSYS/config leaves discovery_prefix unchanged (no Z*65 truncation in subsequent discovery topics), bridge keeps decoding BLE adverts, and SYStoMQTT/LWT stay healthy. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -1348,7 +1348,10 @@ void process_bledata(JsonObject& BLEdata) {
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THEENGS_LOG_TRACE(F("[BLEDecryptor] BTHomeV2 nonce %s" CR), NimBLEUtils::dataToHexString(nonce, noncelength).c_str());
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} else if (BLEdata["encr"].as<int>() == 3) {
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nonce[16] = {0}; // Victron has a 16 byte zero padded nonce with IV bytes 6,7
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// Victron has a 16-byte zero-padded nonce with IV bytes 0,1.
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// (The line `nonce[16] = {0};` that lived here wrote a byte one past the
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// end of the 16-byte `nonce` array on every Victron-encrypted advert;
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// memset below already zeroes the whole buffer, so the typo was dead.)
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unsigned char iv[2];
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int ivlen = hexToBytes(BLEdata["ctr"].as<String>(), iv, 2);
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if (ivlen != 2) {
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